Logic and information
A discipline independent definition of information
Journal of the American Society for Information Science
Information: Does it Have To Be True?
Minds and Machines
Outline of a Theory of Strongly Semantic Information
Minds and Machines
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
The ethics of information transparency
Ethics and Information Technology
Formalising the 'No Information without Data-representation' Principle
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Current Issues in Computing and Philosophy
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
This article mounts a defence of Floridi's theory of strongly semantic information against recent independent objections from Fetzer and Dodig-Crnkovic. It is argued that Fetzer and Dodig-Crnkovic's objections result from an adherence to a redundant practice of analysis. This leads them to fail to accept an informational pluralism, as stipulated by what will be referred to as Shannon's Principle, and the non-reductionist stance. It is demonstrated that Fetzer and Dodig-Crnkovic fail to acknowledge that Floridi's theory of strongly semantic information captures one of our deepest and most compelling intuitions regarding informativeness as a basic notion. This modal intuition will be referred to as the contingency requirement on informativeness. It will be demonstrated that its clarification validates the theory of strongly semantic information as a novel, and non ad hoc solution to the Bar-Hillel-Carnap semantic paradox.