A Secure Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol For Wireless Security

  • Authors:
  • Pierre E. Abi-Char;Abdallah Mhamed;Bachar El-Hassan

  • Affiliations:
  • GET/Institut National des Telecommunications, France;GET/Institut National des Telecommunications, France;Libanese University, Lebanon

  • Venue:
  • IAS '07 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Information Assurance and Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Several protocols have been proposed to provide robust mutual authentication and key establishment for wireless local area network (WLAN). In this paper we present a new Secure Authenticated Key Agreement (SAKA) protocol that provides secure mutual authentication, key establishment and key confirmation over an untrusted network. The new protocol achieves many of the required security and performance properties. It can resist dictionary attacks mounted by either passive or active networks intruders. It can resist Man-In-The Middle attack, and Impersonate attack. It also offers perfect forward secrecy which protects past sessions and passwords against future compromise. In addition, it can resist known-key and resilience to server attack. Our proposed protocol combines techniques of challenge-response protocols with symmetric key agreement protocols and offers significantly improved performance in computational and communication load over comparably many authenticated key agreement protocols such as B-SPEKE, SRP, AMP, PAK-RY, PAK-X, SKA and LR-AKE.