FoG: Fighting the Achilles' Heel of Gossip Protocols with Fountain Codes
SSS '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
Leveraging social networks for increased bittorrent robustness
CCNC'10 Proceedings of the 7th IEEE conference on Consumer communications and networking conference
Improving BitTorrent: a simple approach
IPTPS'08 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Peer-to-peer systems
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Tit-for-tat is widely believed to be the most effective strategy to enforce collaboration among selfish users. However, it has been shown that its usefulness for decentralized and dynamic environments such as peer-topeer networks is marginal, as peers can rapidly end up in a deadlock situation. Many proposed solutions to this problem are either less resilient to freeloading behavior or induce a computational overhead that cannot be sustained by regular peers. In contrast, we retain tit-fortat, but enhance the system with a novel form of source coding and an effective scheme to prevent peers from freeloading from seeding peers. We show that our system performs well without the risk of peer starvation and without sacrificing fairness. The proposed solution has a reasonably low overhead, and may hence be suitable for fully distributed content distribution applications in real networks.