The Design of Rijndael
White-Box Cryptography and an AES Implementation
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Clarifying Obfuscation: Improving the Security of White-Box DES
ITCC '05 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'05) - Volume I - Volume 01
Remote timing attacks are practical
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Web security
On the Impossibility of Obfuscation with Auxiliary Input
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A refined look at Bernstein's AES side-channel analysis
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Cryptanalysis of a white box AES implementation
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Predicting secret keys via branch prediction
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
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In the DRM setting, the attacker is a very powerful adversary, owning the software as well as the underlying hardware. This context is far different from the black-box attacker commonly considered in conventional cryptography.Therefore, cryptographers have tried to design new cryptographic tools fitting the DRM requirements. A related issuein cryptography is that of side-channel attacks, where theattacker is stronger than the black-box attacker, but usually weaker than a DRM attacker. In this paper, we aim toshow that the study of side-channel attacks can benefit fromDRM research, and in particular from the attacker modelsand solutions tailored to this specific setting. We focus ona specific issue, namely the cache attacks against the AES,and show how current counter-measures can be seen as restricted versions of a previous protection proposed in theDRM setting. We demonstrate that those kind of counter-measures are weak against cache-based side-channel attacks by reusing results from the DRM setting.