The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook
Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
Time-bounded task-PIOAs: a framework for analyzing security protocols
DISC'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Distributed Computing
A type system for computationally secure information flow
FCT'05 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
Making random choices invisible to the scheduler
CONCUR'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Concurrency Theory
Calibrating the power of schedulers for probabilistic polynomial-time calculus
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
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When modelling cryto-protocols by means of process calculi which express both nondeterministic and probabilistic behavior, it is customary to view the scheduler as an intruder. It has been established that the traditional scheduler needs to be carefully calibrated in order to more accurately reflect the intruder's capabilities for controlling communication channels. We propose such a class of schedulers through a semantic variant called PPC"@n"@s, of the Probabilistic Poly-time Calculus (PPC) of Mitchell et al. [J.C. Mitchell, A. Ramanathan, A. Scedrov, and V. Teague. A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Theoretical Computer Science, 353:118-164, 2006] and we illustrate the pertinence of our approach by an extensive study of the Dining Cryptographers (DCP) [David Chaum. The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. J. Cryptology, 1(1):65-75, 1988] protocol. Along these lines, we define a new characterization of Mitchell et al.'s observational equivalence [J.C. Mitchell, A. Ramanathan, A. Scedrov, and V. Teague. A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Theoretical Computer Science, 353:118-164, 2006] more suited for taking into account any observable trace instead of just a single action as required in the analysis of the DCP.