Effective memory protection using dynamic tainting

• Authors: James Clause;Ioannis Doudalis;Alessandro Orso;Milos Prvulovic
• Venue: Proceedings of the twenty-second IEEE/ACM international conference on Automated software engineering
• Year: 2007

Programs written in languages that provide direct access tomemory through pointers often contain memory-related faults, which may cause non-deterministic failures and even security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present a new technique based on dynamic tainting for protecting programs from illegal memory accesses. When memory is allocated, at runtime, our technique taints both the memory and the corresponding pointer using the same taint mark. Taint marks are then suitably propagated while the program executes and are checked every time a memory address m is accessed through a pointer p; if the taint marks associated with mand p differ, the execution is stopped and the illegalaccess is reported. To allow for a low-overhead, hardware-assisted implementation of the approach, we make several key technical and engineering decisions in the definition of our technique. In particular, we use a configurable, low number of reusable taint marks instead of a unique mark for each area of memory allocated, which reduces the overhead of the approach without limiting its flexibility and ability to target most memory-related faults and attacks known to date. We also define the technique at the binary level, which lets us handle the (very) common case of applications that use third-party libraries whose source code is unavailable. To investigate the effectiveness and practicality of our approach, we implemented it for heap-allocated memory and performed a preliminary empirical study on a set of programs. Our results show that (1) our technique can identify a large class of memory-related faults, even when using only two unique taint marks, and (2)a hardware-assisted implementation of the technique could achieve overhead in the single digits