A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
A cost-effective, high-bandwidth storage architecture
Proceedings of the eighth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Practical Byzantine fault tolerance
OSDI '99 Proceedings of the third symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
Communications of the ACM
Tangler: a censorship-resistant publishing system based on document entanglements
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Building secure file systems out of byzantine storage
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
All-or-Nothing Encryption and the Package Transform
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Towards an Archival Intermemory
ADL '98 Proceedings of the Advances in Digital Libraries Conference
HOTOS '01 Proceedings of the Eighth Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems
How to build a trusted database system on untrusted storage
OSDI'00 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Symposium on Operating System Design & Implementation - Volume 4
Self-securing storage: protecting data in compromised system
OSDI'00 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Symposium on Operating System Design & Implementation - Volume 4
Fast and secure distributed read-only file system
OSDI'00 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Symposium on Operating System Design & Implementation - Volume 4
Publius: a robust, tamper-evident, censorship-resistant web publishing system
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
On preserving privacy in content-oriented networks
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Information-centric networking
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We give a formal model for systems that store data in entangled form. We propose a new notion of entanglement, called all-or-nothing integrity (AONI) that binds the users' data in a way that makes it hard to corrupt the data of any one user without corrupting the data of all users. AONI can be a useful defense against negligent or dishonest storage providers who might otherwise be tempted to discard documents belonging to users without much clout. We show that, if all users use a fixed standard recovery algorithm, we can implement AONI using a MAC, but, if some of the users adopt instead a non-standard recovery algorithm provided by the dishonest storage provider, AONI can no longer be achieved. However, even for the latter scenario, we describe a simple entangling mechanism that provides AONI for a restricted class of destructive adversaries.