Communications of the ACM - Blueprint for the future of high-performance networking
Source availability and e-voting: an advocate recants
Communications of the ACM - Voting systems
Communications of the ACM - Voting systems
Security analysis of the diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Casting votes in the auditorium
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Are your votes really counted?: testing the security of real-world electronic voting systems
ISSTA '08 Proceedings of the 2008 international symposium on Software testing and analysis
RIES - Rijnland Internet Election System: A Cursory Study of Published Source Code
VOTE-ID '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity
Security analysis of India's electronic voting machines
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Exploiting the client vulnerabilities in internet E-voting systems: hacking Helios 2.0 as an example
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Ethical issues in e-voting security analysis
FC'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
The bug that made me president a browser- and web-security case study on helios voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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The Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer is being used by 90% of the Dutch voters. With very minor modifications, the same computer is also being used in parts of Germany and France. In Ireland the use of this machine is currently on hold after significant doubts were raised concerning its suitability for elections. This paper details how we installed new software in Nedap ES3B voting computers. It details how anyone, when given brief access to the devices at any time before the election, can gain complete and virtually undetectable control over the election results. It also shows how radio emanations from an unmodified ES3B can be received at several meters distance and used to tell what is being voted. We conclude that the Nedap ES3B is unsuitable for use in elections, that the Dutch regulatory framework surrounding e-voting currently insufficiently addresses security, and we pose that not enough thought has been given to the trust relationships and verifiability issues inherent to DRE class voting machines.