An analysis of the hart intercivic DAU eSlate

Authors:
Elliot Proebstel;Sean Riddle;Francis Hsu;Justin Cummins;Freddie Oakley;Tom Stanionis;Matt Bishop
Affiliations:
Dept. of Computer Science, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA;Dept. of Computer Science, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA;Dept. of Computer Science, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA;Dept. of Computer Science, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA;Yolo County Elections Office, Woodland, CA;Yolo County Elections Office, Woodland, CA;Dept. of Computer Science, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA
Venue:
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Year:
2007

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Abstract

This paper reports on an analysis of the Hart Inter-Civic DAU eSlate unit equipped for disabled access and the associated Judge's Booth Controller. The analysis examines whether the eSlate and JBC can be subverted to compromise the accuracy of vote totals, the secrecy of the ballot, and the availability of the system under the procedures in place for Yolo County. We describe several potential attacks, and show how election officials can block or mitigate them.