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Many electronic voting schemes assume the user votes with some computing device. This raises the question whether a voter can trust the device he is using. Three years ago, Chaum, and independently Neff, proposed what we call bare-handed electronic voting, where voters do not need any computational power. Their scheme has a very strong unforgeability guarantee. The price for that, however, is that they require the voter to tell his vote to the voting booth. In this paper we propose a scheme where the voter votes bare-handedly, and still maintains his privacy even with respect to the voting booth. We do this by allowing the voter the use of a computer device but only at a pre-processing stage - the voting itself is done barehandedly. This has many advantages. A voter who has to verify calculations at the booth has to trust the software he is using, while a voter who verifies pre-processed calculations can do that at his own time, getting help from whatever parties he trusts. Achieving private, coercion-resistance, barehanded voting with pre-processing is a non-trivial task and we achieve that only for elections with a bounded number of candidates. Our solution works by proposing an extension to known voting schemes. We show that such extended schemes enjoy the same unforgeability guarantee as that of Chaum and Neff. In addition, our extended scheme is private, and the voter does not reveal his vote to the booth.