Toward undetected operating system fingerprinting

  • Authors:
  • Lloyd G. Greenwald;Tavaris J. Thomas

  • Affiliations:
  • LGS Bell Labs Innovations;LGS Bell Labs Innovations

  • Venue:
  • WOOT '07 Proceedings of the first USENIX workshop on Offensive Technologies
  • Year:
  • 2007

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Tools for active remote operating system fingerprinting generate many packets and are easily detected by host and network defensive devices such as IDS/NIDS. Since each additional packet increases the probability of detection, it is advantageous to minimize the number of probe packets. We make use of an information-theoretic measure of test quality to evaluate fingerprinting probes and use this evaluation to derive effective probe combinations that minimize probe packets. While the default configuration of Nmap's second generation operating system detection transmits 16 different probe packets, we demonstrate successful fingerprinting with one to three packets. Furthermore, these packets are valid TCP SYN packets to open ports, which are less likely to be detected as fingerprinting probes than malformed packets or packets that are not part of a valid TCP three-way handshake.