Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in broadband networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Network assisted power control for wireless data
Mobile Networks and Applications - Special issue on Mobile Multimedia Communications (MOMUC '99)
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
CDMA uplink power control as a noncooperative game
Wireless Networks
A utility-based power-control scheme in wireless cellular systems
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Selfish routing
Nodes bearing grudges: towards routing security, fairness, and robustness in mobile ad hoc networks
EUROMICRO-PDP'02 Proceedings of the 10th Euromicro conference on Parallel, distributed and network-based processing
Architecting noncooperative networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A game theoretic trust model for on-line distributed evolution of cooperation inMANETs
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Game theoretic approach in routing protocol for cooperative wireless sensor networks
ICSI'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Advances in swarm intelligence - Volume Part II
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Trust among nodes in a self-organizing network such as a mobile ad hoc network presents a number of problems and paradoxes. One of the challenging characteristics of wireless and mobile ad hoc networks consists in exploring ways to cope up with selfish behavior of neighbors towards network functions such as routing and forwarding. This paper attempts to deal with such mechanisms and as a result it introduces a distinct model to study the behavior of selfish neighbors using strategic, non-cooperative game theory. Many research works have used Tit-For-Tat strategy for analysis when they deploy game theory to stimulate cooperation. A compliant and an adaptable strategy called Best Neighbor Strategy [BNS] is proposed in this paper for the packet forwarding game in a wireless ad hoc environment. The behavior of nodes is probed varying the proportion of selfishness and also the size of the population while forwarding the packets. The investigations have brought out that the proposed cooperation enforcement policy is scalable, is able to converge faster and is robust against selfishness. BNS achieves evolutionary stability even under the invasion of selfish strategy at different proportions. Further, BNS proves to be a pure evolutionary stable strategy as it evolves to dominate the population from whatever the initial frequency it starts with and it totally out-competes the malign behavior shown by selfish strategy, which means that BNS is immune to invaders. The observations and analysis have shown that the ad hoc paradigm can be modeled significantly using an approach, which has been developed for game theory.