From conditional probability to the logic of doxastic actions

  • Authors:
  • Alexandru Baltag;Sonja Smets

  • Affiliations:
  • Oxford University, Oxford, UK;Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Oxford University, Oxford, UK

  • Venue:
  • TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper-Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (nonnegatively introspective) type of "knowledge". We develop a probabilistic version of this concept ("degree of safety") and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief over conditional probabilistic models. We develop a theory of probabilistic dynamic belief revision, introducing "action models" and a notion of probabilistic update product, that comes together with appropriate reduction laws.