On the relationship between the duration of an encounter and the evolution of cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma

  • Authors:
  • David B. Fogel

  • Affiliations:
  • Natural Selection, Inc. 3333 N. Torrey Pines Ct., Suite 200 La Jolla, CA 92037 e-mail: fogel@sunshine.ucsd.edu

  • Venue:
  • Evolutionary Computation
  • Year:
  • 1995

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Abstract

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to examine the relationship between the durations of encounters and the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of behavioral strategies represented by finite-state machines is evolved over successive generations, with selection made on the basis of individual fitness. Each finite-state machine is given an additional evolvable parameter corresponding to the maximum number of moves it will execute in any encounter. A series of Monte Carlo trials indicates distinct relationships between encounter length and cooperation; however, no causal relationship can be positively identified.