Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
REACT: Rapid Enhanced-Security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Using hash functions as a hedge against chosen ciphertext attack
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Tag-KEM/DEM: a new framework for hybrid encryption and a new analysis of kurosawa-desmedt KEM
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
New directions in cryptography
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Secure multicast key protocol for electronic mail systems with providing perfect forward secrecy
Security and Communication Networks
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Recently, two e-mail protocols were proposed claiming to provide perfect secrecy. These protocols use authentication and (Diffie-Hellman) key-exchange techniques, and as such, other standard security criteria besides perfect forward secrecy include key-replay resilience, known-key security, key freshness and unknown key-share resilience are expected too. In this paper, we show that the two protocols cannot resist replay attacks, and further that the first falls to unknown key-share attacks while the second fails to provide perfect forward secrecy, contrary to the designers' claims. Although the two protocols were intended by the designers to be more secure variants compared to the common e-mail protocol, our results show that being newer does not necessarily mean being more secure.