Mapping the Gnutella Network: Macroscopic Properties of Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Measurement, modeling, and analysis of a peer-to-peer file-sharing workload
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Analyzing peer-to-peer traffic across large networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
An Empirical Analysis of Network Externalities in Peer-to-Peer Music-Sharing Networks
Information Systems Research
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Comparing economic incentives in peer-to-peer networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Special issue: Internet economics: Pricing and policies
Why share in peer-to-peer networks?
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Electronic commerce
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We present a model of bandwidth allocation in a stylized peer-to-peer file sharing network with s peers (sharers) who share files and download from each other and f peers (freeriders) who download from sharers but do not contribute files. Assuming that upload bandwidth is scarcer than download bandwidth and efficient allocation, we compute the expected bandwidth obtained by each peer. We show that (i) while the exact formula is complex, s/(s+f) is a good approximation and (ii) sharers (freeriders) obtain bandwidth larger (smaller) than s/(s+f). The paper constitutes a first step towards a general analytical foundation for scarce resource allocation in peer-to-peer file sharing networks.