Equilibria in Bundle-Reducing Strategies for Combinatorial Auctions

Authors:
Fernando Beltran
Affiliations:
-
Venue:
WI-IATW '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Workshops
Year:
2007

Citing 2
Cited 0

Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions

Artificial Intelligence
Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling

Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We search for equilibria on a reduced subset of the set of strategies a bidder may use in a combinatorial auction. The strategies allow the bidders to reduce their preferred bundle in response to adverse auction results which are known after each round. Extensive experimentation using an agent-based computational simulator was conducted after which it is recognized that efficiency of the auction can be increased when bidders are allowed to reformulate their bids during the auction.