Internet peering as a network of relations

Authors:
Steffen Lippert;Giancarlo Spagnolo
Affiliations:
Department of Commerce, Massey University Auckland, PB 102904, NSMC, Auckland, New Zealand;Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics and Institutions, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via Columbia 2, I-00133 Rome, Italy
Venue:
Telecommunications Policy
Year:
2008

Citing 1
Cited 2

On the economics of Internet peering

Netnomics

Entry may increase network providers' profit

Telecommunications Policy
Controlling the growth of internet routing tables through market mechanisms

Proceedings of the Re-Architecting the Internet Workshop

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This paper applies results from recent theoretical work on networks of relations to analyze optimal peering strategies for asymmetric Internet Service Providers (ISPs). From a network of relations perspective, ISPs' asymmetry in bilateral peering agreements need not be a problem, since when these form a closed network, asymmetries are pooled and information transmission is faster. Both these effects reduce the incentives for opportunism in general, and interconnection quality degradation in particular. The paper also explains why bilateral monetary transfers between asymmetric ISPs (Bilateral Paid Peering), though potentially good for bilateral peering, may have negative effects on the sustainability of the overall peering network.