A formal security policy for xenon
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Formal methods: Practice and experience
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Using formal methods for security in the Xenon project
Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
Analyzing a formal specification of Mondex using model checking
ICTAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th International colloquium conference on Theoretical aspects of computing
Verifying security properties of internet protocol stacks: The split verification approach
Journal of Systems Architecture: the EUROMICRO Journal
JCML: A specification language for the runtime verification of Java Card programs
Science of Computer Programming
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We describe our experiences in mechanising the specification, refinement, and proof of the Mondex Electronic Purse using the Z/Eves theorem prover. We took a conservative approach and mechanised the original LaTEX sources without changing their technical content, except to correct errors. We found problems in the original specification and some missing invariants in the refinements. Based on these experiences, we present novel and detailed guidance on how to drive Z/Eves successfully. The work contributes to the Repository for the Verified Software Grand Challenge.