Pricing computer services: queueing effects
Communications of the ACM
A framework for robust measurement-based admission control
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Optimization flow control—I: basic algorithm and convergence
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
End-to-end congestion control for the internet: delays and stability
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Testing the Gaussian approximation of aggregate traffic
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet measurment
Optimal Provisioning and Pricing of Internet Differentiated Services in Hierarchical Markets
ICN '01 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Networking-Part 1
Pricing strategies under heterogeneous service requirements
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
QoS-aware bandwidth provisioning for IP network links
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization)
Internet service classes under competition
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Efficiency and Braess' Paradox under pricing in general networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Fundamental design issues for the future Internet
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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This paper studies the interplay between a profit-maximizing network and a number of users competing for the finite bandwidth on each link. In our setting, the objectives of the network and the users are 'misaligned', in that the prices that optimize the network's profit do not maximize the aggregate utility of the users. The links set the prices for bandwidth and the users react to them by revealing their preferred amounts of bandwidth. A first contribution of this work is an iterative procedure for a single-link model. In this provably convergent scheme, the link adapts the price to achieve profit maximization, and each individual user adapts its demand for bandwidth so as to maximize its 'compensated utility', where utility is a function of its allocated bandwidth. Importantly, the scheme relies on communication between the link and the individual users, but not between users. In practice, the utility of the users (ISPs) strongly depends on the level of satisfaction experienced by their clients (the end-users). We show how the iteration scheme can be adapted to the more natural situation of utility being a function of the loss probability, rather than a function of the bandwidth. Since the end-users' supply of traffic is not fully known to the ISPs, we develop a Bayesian approach for estimating the loss probability from measurements; we do so in the practically relevant context of Gaussian input traffic. The resulting estimator proves to be particularly useful for risk-averse ISPs.