Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Coordination of Purchasing and Bidding Activities across Markets
HICSS '04 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'04) - Track 7 - Volume 7
Flow-based resource allocation in a multiple-access wireless market-setting using an auction
ICDCSW '06 Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International ConferenceWorkshops on Distributed Computing Systems
Next-generation wireless communications concepts and technologies
IEEE Communications Magazine
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We investigate equilibrium properties of a bidding strategy in a situation in which bidders attempt to purchase a given amount of a divisible resource by bidding on multiple auctions. Each seller uses the Progressive Second-Price auction. A domain of application is the next-generation of wireless networks, in which multiple, competing network providers sell bandwidth to multiple users able to aggregate their purchased bandwidth shares. Every bidder needs to coordinate his bids to maximise the utility derived from all auction. In order to deal with aggregation and coordination of bids, we introduce the notion of an aggregate market, which is an artificial construct that each bidder uses to distribute his demand among the auctions. Furthermore, the aggregate market helps to understand convergence of the bidding process occurring at each individual auction. We show that by using an incentive-compatible, efficient mechanism at each single auction bidders have incentives to truthfully reveal their demand to the aggregate market.