An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Wireless Networks
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Self-Organized Public-Key Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Low-Energy Key Management Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks
ISCC '03 Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE International Symposium on Computers and Communications
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Random key-assignment for secure Wireless Sensor Networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Location-based pairwise key establishments for static sensor networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Security in wireless sensor networks
Communications of the ACM - Wireless sensor networks
URSA: ubiquitous and robust access control for mobile ad hoc networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A pairwise key predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Design principles for tamper-resistant smartcard processors
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
Improved multi-precision squaring for low-end RISC microcontrollers
Journal of Systems and Software
Enhancing the attacking efficiency of the node capture attack in WSN: a matrix approach
The Journal of Supercomputing
Cooperative secret delivery in wireless sensor networks
International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing
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When setting up a sensor network, one of the first requirements is to establish cryptographic keys for later use. However, the traditional key establishment techniques cannot be directly applied due to the inherent properties of sensor networks. Recently, a promising methodology, random key pre-distribution schemes based on symmetric cryptography, has been proposed. In this paper, we study the problem of replication attack on random key pre-distribution schemes. Using a combination of modeling, analysis, and experiments, we analyze, characterize, and discuss the relationship among the replicated hostile nodes, the sensor networks, and the resiliency of various random key pre-distribution schemes against replication attack. Example findings include: (1) the sensor networks with random key pre-distribution schemes, even with one replicated sensor, start to become almost 100% insecure when the adversary captures and stores the key information equivalent to those carried by one good sensor node; and (2) when the replicated node has less memory to store key information than the original node, among the proposed schemes, the q-composite scheme with larger q is most resilient against replication attack while the basic scheme is least resilient and the Blom-based scheme lies in between the above two schemes. Interestingly, it is the other way round when the replicated node has more memory to store key information than the original node. Moreover, as a transition, the resilience against replication attack is the same for all the random schemes when the replicated and original nodes have the same memory to store key information. This study not only provides practical insights into the design of more secure and efficient key establishment schemes allowing simple key establishment for large-scale sensor networks, but can also be used to predict the payoff that an adversary can gain after injecting a certain number of nodes into the sensor networks.