International Journal of Game Theory
Congestion avoidance and control
SIGCOMM '88 Symposium proceedings on Communications architectures and protocols
On-line generalized Steiner problem
Proceedings of the seventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimization flow control—I: basic algorithm and convergence
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
Stable internet routing without global coordination
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The stable paths problem and interdomain routing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Lectures on Discrete Geometry
Simultaneous optimization for concave costs: single sink aggregation or single source buy-at-bulk
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Improved Results for Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
SIAM Journal on Computing
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Universal approximations for TSP, Steiner tree, and set cover
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the topologies formed by selfish peers
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Network design with weighted players
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The complexity of game dynamics: BGP oscillations, sink equilibria, and beyond
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Local Two-Stage Myopic Dynamics for Network Formation Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
$\mathcal{NP}$-Hardness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Scheduling and Connection Games
SOFSEM '09 Proceedings of the 35th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
Covering Games: Approximation through Non-cooperation
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
On the social cost of distributed selfish content replication
NETWORKING'08 Proceedings of the 7th international IFIP-TC6 networking conference on AdHoc and sensor networks, wireless networks, next generation internet
Socially-aware network design games
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
An architectural view of game theoretic control
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
A game theoretic analysis of network design with socially-aware users
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Stackelberg strategies for network design games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Strategic multiway cut and multicut games
WAOA'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
A Nash bargaining solution for cooperative network formation games
NETWORKING'11 Proceedings of the 10th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part I
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
Operations Research
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In a network with selfish users, designing and deploying a protocol determines the rules of the game by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We study the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of the induced network game. We consider network cost-sharing games, where the set of Nash equilibria depends fundamentally on the choice of an edge cost-sharing protocol. Previous research focused on the Shapley protocol, in which the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users. We systematically study the design of optimal cost-sharing protocols for undirected and directed graphs, single-sink and multicommodity networks, different classes of cost-sharing methods, and different measures of the inefficiency of equilibria. One of our main technical tools is a complete characterization of the uniform cost-sharing protocols---protocols that are designed without foreknowledge of or assumptions on the network in which they will be deployed. We use this characterization result to identify the optimal uniform protocol in several scenarios: for example, the Shapley protocol is optimal in directed graphs, while the optimal protocol in undirected graphs, a simple priority scheme, has exponentially smaller worst-case price of anarchy than the Shapley protocol. We also provide several matching upper and lower bounds on the best-possible performance of non-uniform cost-sharing protocols.