How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Fault Induction Attacks, Tamper Resistance, and Hostile Reverse Engineering in Perspective
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Optical Fault Induction Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Fault Attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete Results and Practical Countermeasures
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Using Memory Errors to Attack a Virtual Machine
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Active Hardware Attacks and Proactive Countermeasures
ISCC '02 Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC'02)
A Fault-Injection Attack on Fiat-Shamir Cryptosystems
ICDCSW '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops - W7: EC (ICDCSW'04) - Volume 7
Remote timing attacks are practical
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Fiat-shamir identification scheme immune to the hardware fault attacks
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS) - Special section on ESTIMedia'12, LCTES'11, rigorous embedded systems design, and multiprocessor system-on-chip for cyber-physical systems
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Implementation cryptanalysis has emerged as a realistic threat for cryptographic systems. It consists of two classes of attacks: fault-injection and side-channel attacks. In this work, we examine the resistance of the Fiat--Shamir scheme to fault-injection attacks, since Fiat--Shamir is a popular scheme for “light” consumer devices, such as smartcards, in a wide range of consumer services. We prove that an existing attack, known as the Bellcore attack, is incomplete. We propose an extension to the protocol that proactively secures Fiat--Shamir systems from the Bellcore attack and we prove its strength. Finally, we introduce a new attack model, which, under stronger assumptions, can derive the secret keys from both the original Fiat--Shamir scheme as well as its proposed extension. Our approach demonstrates that countermeasures for implementation cryptanalysis must be carefully designed and that deployed systems must include appropriate protection mechanisms for all known attacks and be flexible enough to incorporate countermeasures for new ones.