Probabilistic privacy leakage from challenge-response RFID authentication protocols

Authors:
Seongan Lim;Ikkwon Yie
Affiliations:
Inha University, Department of Mathematics, Incheon City, Korea;Inha University, Department of Mathematics, Incheon City, Korea
Venue:
AIC'07 Proceedings of the 7th Conference on 7th WSEAS International Conference on Applied Informatics and Communications - Volume 7
Year:
2007

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Abstract

To assure the privacy of RFID Tags, symmetric challenge-response identification protocols have been considered. Due to the low cost requirements for tags, it has been assumed that the tampering of RFID tags is possible. In this paper, we estimate the privacy leakage of challenge-response RFID authentication protocols based on symmetric key using discrete probability under the assumption that tampering the RFID tags are possible.