Information flow security in Boundary Ambients

  • Authors:
  • Chiara Braghin;Agostino Cortesi;Riccardo Focardi

  • Affiliations:
  • Dipartimento di Tecnologie dell'Informazione, Università degli Studi di Milano, via Bramante 65, Crema, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia, via Torino 155, Mestre, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia, via Torino 155, Mestre, Italy

  • Venue:
  • Information and Computation
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

A variant of the Mobile Ambient calculus, called Boundary Ambients, is introduced, supporting the modelling of multi-level security policies. Ambients that may guarantee to properly protect their content are explicitly identified as boundaries: a boundary can be seen as a resource access manager for confidential data. In this setting, absence of direct information leakage is granted as soon as the initial process satisfies some syntactic conditions. We then give a new notion of non-interference for Boundary Ambients aiming at capturing indirect flows, too. We design a Control Flow Analysis that computes an over-approximation of all ambients that may be affected at run-time by high-level data and we show that this static analysis can be used to enforce non-interference, i.e., to statically detect that no (direct or indirect) information leakage is ever possible at run-time.