Multilevel security in the UNIX tradition
Software—Practice & Experience
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies into the Linux Operating System
Proceedings of the FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
The flask security architecture: system support for diverse security policies
SSYM'99 Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 8
Making information flow explicit in HiStar
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7
Secure web applications via automatic partitioning
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
Information flow control for standard OS abstractions
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
Labels and event processes in the Asbestos operating system
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
SIF: enforcing confidentiality and integrity in web applications
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Privacy-preserving browser-side scripting with BFlow
Proceedings of the 4th ACM European conference on Computer systems
Improving application security with data flow assertions
Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles
Neon: system support for derived data management
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS international conference on Virtual execution environments
DIFC programs by automatic instrumentation
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Transactions on computational science XI
GuardRails: a data-centric web application security framework
WebApps'11 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX conference on Web application development
Distributed middleware enforcement of event flow security policy
Proceedings of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX 11th International Conference on Middleware
Abstractions for usable information flow control in Aeolus
USENIX ATC'12 Proceedings of the 2012 USENIX conference on Annual Technical Conference
Secure programming via visibly pushdown safety games
CAV'12 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
A software-hardware architecture for self-protecting data
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Heuristic safety analysis of access control models
Proceedings of the 18th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
On quantitative dynamic data flow tracking
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
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The continuing frequency and seriousness of security incidents underline the critical importance of application security. Decentralized information flow control (DIFC), a promising tool for improving application security, gives application developers fine-grained control over security policy and privilege management. DIFC developers can partition much application functionality into untrusted components bound by a kernel- or language-enforced security policy. Unless a (usually smaller and less exposed) trusted component is exploited, the effects of an application compromise are contained by the policy. Although system-based DIFC can simultaneously achieve high performance and effective isolation, it offers a challenging programming model. Fine-grained policy specifications are spread over several application pieces. Common programming errors may be indistinguishable from policy exploit attempts, the system cannot expose developers to information about these errors, complicating debugging. Static checking (as in language based systems) and new system primitives can reduce these problems, but for dynamic applications like web servers, they do not eliminate them. In this paper we propose subsystems that make decentralized information flow more manageable. First, a policy description language specifies an application-wide security policy in one localized place; communication restrictions are compiled into lower-level labels. Second, information flow-safe debugging mechanisms let developers debug DIFC applications without violating security policies. Although these mechanisms are preliminary, we demonstrate their effectiveness using applications similar to those developed for Asbestos and other DIFC systems.