An update on quantum cryptography
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Secret sharing homomorphisms: keeping shares of a secret secret
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 27th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science October 27-29, 1986
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Gradual and Verifiable Release of a Secret
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
How to Solve any Protocol Problem - An Efficiency Improvement
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party's Input and Correctness of the Result
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
How Much Do You Trust Big Brother?
IEEE Internet Computing
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A multiparty-computation protocol allows each of a set of participants to provide secret input to a mutually agreed computation. Such protocols enforce two security properties: (1) secrecy of the inputs, apart from what is revealed by the output; and (2) correctness of the output, as defined by the agreed computation. All solutions, including those presented here, are based on two kinds of assumptions: (a) public-key cryptography; and (b) limited collusion in a setting where pairs of participants can exchange messages with secret and authenticated content. Some of the previous solutions relied totally on assumption (a), the others totally on (b).