Transaction generators: root kits for web

  • Authors:
  • Collin Jackson;Dan Boneh;John Mitchell

  • Affiliations:
  • Stanford University;Stanford University;Stanford University

  • Venue:
  • HOTSEC'07 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX workshop on Hot topics in security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Current phishing attacks focus primarily on stealing user credentials such as passwords. In response, web sites are deploying stronger authentication and back-end analytics systems that make it harder for phishers to extract value from stolen passwords. As defenses against traditional phishing improve, we expect to see huge growth in the use of a different type of malware called a Transaction Generator (TG). Instead of relying on stolen credentials, a TG simply waits for the user to log in to his account and then issues transactions on behalf of the user. Since strong authentication is ineffective against TGs, mitigation must focus on transaction integrity. We discuss rootkit-like methods that allow TGs to hide their tracks, and explore a number of mitigation techniques, including transaction confirmation. These results suggest that recent identity systems such as CardSpace and OpenID must also address transaction integrity.