A Quantitative Model of the Security Intrusion Process Based on Attacker Behavior
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Toward cost-sensitive modeling for intrusion detection and response
Journal of Computer Security
Modeling and Quantification of Security Attributes of Software Systems
DSN '02 Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Model-Based Evaluation: From Dependability to Security
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Model Checking Markov Reward Models with Impulse Rewards
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Modeling and Simulation in Security Evaluation
IEEE Security and Privacy
Using CP-nets as a guide for countermeasure selection
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Impact Analysis of Faults and Attacks in Large-Scale Networks
IEEE Security and Privacy
Using hidden markov models to evaluate the risks of intrusions
RAID'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Janus: a two-sided analytical model for multi-stage coordinated attacks
ICISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
A framework for security quantification of networked machines
COMSNETS'10 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on COMmunication systems and NETworks
EVMAT: an OVAL and NVD based enterprise vulnerability modeling and assessment tool
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Southeast Regional Conference
A multi-layer tree model for enterprise vulnerability management
Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Information technology education
Hi-index | 0.00 |
A challenging issue in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is to quantify network attributes with respect to security. This paper presents a model-based semi-quantitative approach for evaluating the security of enterprise networks. Instead of focusing on particular attacks/intrusions, our approach aims at characterizing attacker behaviors by examining attacker intent, objective, and attack consequence, which are essential for enforcing an attack scheme. In particular, an attack scheme involving several atomic attacks is formulated as a partially observable Markov decision process: a goal-directed attacker takes a sequence of actions to achieve the malicious goal, and a reward signal is used as feedback to integrate the attacker's intent, cost and objective and guides its advances. It is also used to measure attack impact, from security analyst's economic perspective, by considering the significance of network assets. Our approach provides network administrators a useful tool for performing better countermeasures during the risk management process. We carry out a real trace study to demonstrate its feasibility in practice and validate its performance.