Internet cost structures and interconnection agreements
Internet economics
The economics of Internet interconnection agreements
Internet economics
ISP survival guide: strategies for running a competitive ISP
ISP survival guide: strategies for running a competitive ISP
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On inferring autonomous system relationships in the internet
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Dynamics of hot-potato routing in IP networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Net neutrality: the technical side of the debate: a white paper
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Interconnecting eyeballs to content: a shapley value perspective on isp peering and settlement
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
On cooperative settlement between content, transit and eyeball internet service providers
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Distributed ant algorithm for inter-carrier service composition
NGI'09 Proceedings of the 5th Euro-NGI conference on Next Generation Internet networks
ClubMED: coordinated multi-exit discriminator strategies for peering carriers
NGI'09 Proceedings of the 5th Euro-NGI conference on Next Generation Internet networks
Algorithms for SLA composition to provide inter-domain services
IM'09 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP/IEEE international conference on Symposium on Integrated Network Management
An agent-based model for the evolution of the internet ecosystem
COMSNETS'09 Proceedings of the First international conference on COMmunication Systems And NETworks
Incentivizing peer-assisted services: a fluid shapley value approach
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Cooperation via contracts: stability and algorithms
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
On economic heavy hitters: shapley value analysis of 95th-percentile pricing
IMC '10 Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
The Internet is flat: modeling the transition from a transit hierarchy to a peering mesh
Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Cooperative profit sharing in coalition-based resource allocation in wireless networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
International Journal of Communication Networks and Distributed Systems
Sharing the cost of backbone networks: cui bono?
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Internet measurement conference
Optimum profit allocation in coalitional VoD service
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Bailout forward contracts for edge-to-edge internet services
Computer Communications
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Within the current Internet, autonomous ISPs implement bilateral agreements, with each ISP establishing agreements that suit its own local objective to maximize its profit. Peering agreements based on local views and bilateral settlements, while expedient, encourage selfish routing strategies and discriminatory interconnections. From a more global perspective, such settlements reduce aggregate profits, limit the stability of routes, and discourage potentially useful peering/connectivity arrangements, thereby unnecessarily balkanizing the Internet. We show that if the distribution of profits is enforced at a global level, then there exist profit-sharing mechanisms derived from the coalition games concept of Shapley value and its extensions that will encourage these selfish ISPs who seek to maximize their own profits to converge to a Nash equilibrium. We show that these profit sharing schemes exhibit several fairness properties that support the argument that this distribution of profits is desirable. In addition, at the Nash equilibrium point, the routing and connecting/peering strategies maximize aggregate network profits, encourage ISP connectivity so as to limit balkanization.