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Simulation of Security Protocols based on Scenarios of Attacks
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IIT'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Innovations in information technology
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Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
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Assurance of security protocols needs particular attention. Flaws in a protocol can devastate security of the applications that rely on it. Analysis of the protocols is difficult and it is recommended that formal methods are employed to provide for higher levels of assurance. However, the formal methods can cover only a part of the scope of the problem. It is important that the formal models are valid representations of the protocol and that the application context is adequately represented. In the paper we present an analytical framework that integrates the object-oriented and formal modeling approaches. Object models are used to capture the relevant aspects of the protocol and its security context and to communicate with the protocol designers. Formal models are applied to verify the protocol security properties. Applicability of the framework was demonstrated by several industrial case studies.