Non-interactive conference key distribution and its applications

  • Authors:
  • Reihaneh Safavi-Naini;Shaoquan Jiang

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Calgary;University of Calgary

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

A non-interactive conference key distribution system (or, a NICKDS for short) allows conference members to calculate a shared key without interacting with each other. NICKDSs have been studied in unconditional and computational settings. In both cases security has been evaluated against an adversary who can corrupt participants. In this paper we consider an adaptive adversary who can both corrupt participants and also access the keys of conference of his choice. We re-visit security of a number of known NICKDSs in this new model and present characterizations and conditions that guarantee security of the system in the new model. We also give a generic construction for computationally secure (in the new model) NICKDSs, from unconditionally secure ones in corruption only model. To show the usefulness of the new security model, we consider two composition constructions. First, we compose a secure NICKDS with a secure MAC by using the key obtained from the NICKDS as the MAC key, and show that this results in a ring authentication that guarantees authenticity of the received message while the sender remains anonymous and this anonymity is unconditional. The security theorem for the composition guarantees security for unconditional and computational settings, both. We also consider composition of a NICKDS with a secure (CCA2 secure) encryption system and show this results in a broadcast encryption system (BES) that is CCA2 secure. This is the first CCA2 secure BES in symmetric key setting. We discuss future works and open problems.