A case for end system multicast (keynote address)
Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
OceanStore: an architecture for global-scale persistent storage
ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
King: estimating latency between arbitrary internet end hosts
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet measurment
Pastry: Scalable, Decentralized Object Location, and Routing for Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems
Middleware '01 Proceedings of the IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms Heidelberg
PIC: Practical Internet Coordinates for Distance Estimation
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Vivaldi: a decentralized network coordinate system
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Real attacks on virtual networks: Vivaldi out of tune
Proceedings of the 2006 SIGCOMM workshop on Large-scale attack defense
A network positioning system for the internet
ATEC '04 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
On the accuracy of embeddings for internet coordinate systems
IMC '05 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement
Internet routing policies and round-trip-times
PAM'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement
Securing internet coordinate embedding systems
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
On the accuracy of decentralized virtual coordinate systems in adversarial networks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Securing Internet Coordinate Systems
AINTEC '07 Proceedings of the 3rd Asian conference on Internet Engineering: Sustainable Internet
Distributed algorithms for stable and secure network coordinates
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
A reputation-based approach for securing vivaldi embedding system
EUNICE'07 Proceedings of the 13th open European summer school and IFIP TC6.6 conference on Dependable and adaptable networks and services
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Secure latency estimation with treeple
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Robust Decentralized Virtual Coordinate Systems in Adversarial Environments
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Network coordinates in the wild
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
The Frog-Boiling Attack: Limitations of Secure Network Coordinate Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Securing application-level topology estimation networks: facing the frog-boiling attack
RAID'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
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Internet coordinate-based systems are poised to become an important service to support overlay construction and topology-aware applications. Indeed, through network distance embedding into an appropriate geometric space, such systems allow for accurate network distance estimations with low overhead. However, coordinate systems often rely on good cooperation between nodes for correct coordination and assume that information reported by probed nodes is correct. In this paper, we identify various attacks against coordinate embedding systems and show their effectiveness on two representative positioning systems, namely Vivaldi and NPS. Our study demonstrates that these attacks can seriously disrupt the operations of these systems and therefore the virtual networks and applications relying on them for distance measurements. Through simulations of different potential scenarios where malicious nodes provide biased coordinate information and delay measurement probes, we quantify the effects of attack strategies that aim to (i) introduce disorder in the system, (ii) fool honest nodes to move far away from their correct positions and (iii) isolate particular target nodes in the system through collusion. Our findings confirm the susceptibility of the coordinate systems to such attacks.