The space complexity of approximating the frequency moments
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
An analysis of BGP convergence properties
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Some optimal inapproximability results
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Stable internet routing without global coordination
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Policy Disputes in Path-Vector Protocols
ICNP '99 Proceedings of the Seventh Annual International Conference on Network Protocols
Design principles of policy languages for path vector protocols
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Implications of autonomy for the expressiveness of policy routing
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
An algebraic theory of dynamic network routing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Incentive-compatible interdomain routing
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 02
Interdomain Routing as Social Choice
ICDCSW '06 Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International ConferenceWorkshops on Distributed Computing Systems
Mechanism design for policy routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 04
Subjective-cost policy routing
Theoretical Computer Science
The communication complexity of uncoupled nash equilibrium procedures
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory
The complexity of game dynamics: BGP oscillations, sink equilibria, and beyond
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive-compatible interdomain routing with linear utilities
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rationality and traffic attraction: incentives for honest path announcements in bgp
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Asynchronous Best-Reply Dynamics
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Neighbor-specific BGP: more flexible routing policies while improving global stability
Proceedings of the eleventh international joint conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Learning equilibria in repeated congestion games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Understanding incentives for prefix aggregation in BGP
Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on Re-architecting the internet
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Incentive compatibility and dynamics of congestion control
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Putting BGP on the right path: a case for next-hop routing
Hotnets-IX Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
On the structure of weakly acyclic games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Incentive-compatible distributed greedy protocols
Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Toward a practical approach for BGP stability with root cause check
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Weakly-acyclic (internet) routing games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Empirical Study on Entity Interaction Graph of Large-Scale Parallel Simulations
PADS '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Workshop on Principles of Advanced and Distributed Simulation
Path-vector routing stability analysis
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
On the stability of interdomain routing
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Best-response dynamics out of sync: complexity and characterization
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
What's a little collusion between friends?
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
An economic analysis of routing conflict and its resolution
Performance Evaluation
A survey of interdomain routing policies
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Weakly-Acyclic (Internet) Routing Games
Theory of Computing Systems
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We present a game-theoretic model that captures many of the intricacies of interdomain routing in today's Internet. In this model, the strategic agents are source nodes located on a network, who aim to send traffic to a unique destination node. The interaction between the agents is dynamic and complex -- asynchronous, sequential, and based on partial information. Best-reply dynamics in this model capture crucial aspects of the interdomain routing protocol de facto, namely the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). We study complexity and incentive-related issues in this model. Our main results are showing that in realistic and well-studied settings, BGP is incentive-compatible. I.e., not only does myopic behaviour of all players converge to a "stable" routing outcome, but no player has motivation to unilaterally deviate from the protocol. Moreover, we show that even coalitions of players of any size cannot improve their routing outcomes by collaborating. Unlike the vast majority of works in mechanism design, our results do not require any monetary transfers (to or by the agents).