Data networks
CDMA uplink power control as a noncooperative game
Wireless Networks
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Capacity of fading channels with channel side information
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Fading channels: information-theoretic and communications aspects
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Exploiting decentralized channel state information for random access
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Distributed approaches for exploiting multiuser diversity in wireless networks
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
The Water-Filling Game in Fading Multiple-Access Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Reservation-based distributed medium access in wireless collision channels
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
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We consider a wireless collision channel, shared by a finite number of mobile users who transmit to a common base station using a random access protocol. Mobiles are self-optimizing, and wish to minimize their individual average power investment subject to minimum-throughput demand. The channel state between each mobile and the base station is stochastically time-varying and is observed by the mobile prior to transmission. Given the current channel state, a mobile may decide whether to transmit or not, and to determine the transmission power in case of transmission. In this paper, we investigate the properties of the Nash equilibrium of the resulting game in multiuser networks. We characterize the best-response strategy of the mobile and show that it leads to a "water-filling"-like power allocation. Our equilibrium analysis then reveals that one of the possible equilibria is uniformly best for all mobiles. Furthermore, this equilibrium can be reached by a simple distributed mechanism that does not require specific information on other mobiles' actions. We then explore some additional characteristics of the distributed power control framework. Braess-like paradoxes are reported, where the use of multiple power levels can diminish system capacity and also lead to larger per-user power consumption, compared to the case where a single level only is permitted.