Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Verification of Security Protocols
VMCAI '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
CoSP: a general framework for computational soundness proofs
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Calibrating the power of schedulers for probabilistic polynomial-time calculus
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A certifying compiler for zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge based on Σ-protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Computational soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs
Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
A composable computational soundness notion
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A dolev-yao model for zero knowledge
ASIAN'09 Proceedings of the 13th Asian conference on Advances in Computer Science: information Security and Privacy
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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The abstraction of cryptographic operations by term algebras, called Dolev-Yao models, is essential in almost all tool-supported methods for proving security protocols. Recently significant progress was made in proving that Dolev-Yao models offering the core cryptographic operations such as encryption and digital signatures can be sound with respect to actual cryptographic realizations and security definitions. Recent work, however, has started to extend Dolev-Yao models to more sophisticated operations with unique security features. Zero-knowledge proofs arguably constitute the most amazing such extension. In this paper, we first identify which additional properties a cryptographic zero-knowledge proof needs to fulfill in order to serve as a computationally sound implementation of symbolic (Dolev-Yao style) zero-knowledge proofs; this leads to the novel definition of a symbolically-sound zero-knowledge proof system. We prove that even in the presence of arbitrary active adversaries, such proof systems constitute computationally sound implementations of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs. This yields the first computational soundness result for symbolic zero-knowledge proofs and the first such result against fully active adversaries of Dolev-Yao models that go beyond the core cryptographic operations.