Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficient Identity Based Signature Schemes Based on Pairings
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Key Agreement Protocols and Their Security Analysis
Proceedings of the 6th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Escrow-free encryption supporting cryptographic workflow
International Journal of Information Security
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Stronger security of authenticated key exchange
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
On the connection between signcryption and one-pass key establishment
Cryptography and Coding'07 Proceedings of the 11th IMA international conference on Cryptography and coding
One-Way and two-party authenticated ID-Based key agreement protocols using pairing
MDAI'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Hybrid signcryption schemes with outsider security
ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
Provably secure certificateless one-way and two-party authenticated key agreement protocol
ICISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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One-pass authenticated key establishment (AKE) protocols are arguably better suited to the ID-based environment than their two-pass counterparts. However, there is no ID-based one-pass AKE protocol proposed in the literature with a proof of security in an appropriate model. This paper addresses the current gap by proposing a new ID-based one-pass AKE protocol and proving it secure in a formal model. The security of the new protocol is treated under a model adapted from a formal security model for traditional certificate based AKE protocols. The proof of security is in the random oracle model and is based on the hardness of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. The protocol also turns out to be the most efficient of all the previously known protocols. It can work over a class of asymmetric pairings for better efficiency at higher bit security levels.