Communications of the ACM
Gathering evidence: use of visual security cues in web browsers
GI '05 Proceedings of Graphics Interface 2005
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Do security toolbars actually prevent phishing attacks?
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Designing ethical phishing experiments: a study of (ROT13) rOnl query features
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on World Wide Web
Web wallet: preventing phishing attacks by revealing user intentions
SOUPS '06 Proceedings of the second symposium on Usable privacy and security
The Emperor's New Security Indicators
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An evaluation of extended validation and picture-in-picture phishing attacks
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
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Website authentication technologies attempt to make the identity of a website clear to the user, by supplying information about the identity of the website. In practice however, usability issues can prevent users from correctly identifying the websites they are interacting with. To help identify usability issues we present RUST, a Retargetable USability Testbed for website authentication technologies. RUST is a testbed that consists of a test harness, which provides the ability to easily configure the environment for running usability study sessions, and a usability study design that evaluates usability based on spoofability, learnability, and acceptability. We present data collected by RUST and discuss preliminary results for two authentication technologies, Microsoft CardSpace and Verisign Secure Letterhead. Based on the data collected, we conclude that the testbed is useful for gathering data on a variety of technologies.