An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Revisiting random key pre-distribution schemes for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
The Strange Logic of Random Graphs
The Strange Logic of Random Graphs
Deterministic key predistribution schemes for distributed sensor networks
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Random sampling key revocation scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments
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Sensor nodes are low-cost computing devices combining wireless transmitters with specialized sensors, such as temperature, humidity, light, motion, speed, acoustic, chemical and seismic sensors. Sensor nodes are typically deployed in great density over a large geographical area. After deployment, these nodes organize themselves into an ad hoc network to gather the required information from the target environment. A variety of key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed for establishing secure communication in sensor networks. Key pre-distribution schemes bootstrap secret information in each sensor node to enable secure link establishment after deployment. The secure link establishment probabilistically depends on whether two neighboring nodes share some common secret information preloaded before deployment. In this paper, we address key pre-distribution schemes from system aspects: the estimation of maximum supported network coverage area, which memory size to choose and how many nodes to deploy in a target area. Since the unit cost of a sensor node and network density determine the total cost of a sensor network, we believe the analysis of the relationship between memory space, network density and security can benefit the realistic deployment of cost-aware sensor networks. We come to the conclusion that the security performance of key pre-distribution schemes is determined by the cost of the network. The schemes of Eschenhauer et al. and Du et al. can improve the network resilience to node capture or increase the maximum supported network coverage area either by increasing memory space or by increasing network density. On the other hand, in the scheme of Camtepe et al., increasing memory space requires increasing the network density at the same time to improve the security. The scheme of Chan et al. is perfectly resistant to node capture and the maximum supported network coverage area is determined by the memory space only. Contrary to intuition, the scheme of Chan et al. is most efficient when it reduces to preload N -1 keys in each node in the network of N nodes.