Discrete time dynamic multi-leader-follower games with feedback perfect information

  • Authors:
  • Pu-yan Nie

  • Affiliations:
  • College of Economics and Trade Hunan University Changsha 410079, P.R. China Department of Mathematics, College of Information, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, P.R. China

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Systems Science
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Both Stackelberg games and Nash games play extremely important roles in such fields as economics, management, politics and behavioral sciences. Stackelberg game can be modelled as a bilevel optimization problem. Static multi-leader-follower optimization problems are initially proposed by Pang and Fukushima. In this article, a discrete time dynamic version of multi-leader-follower games with feedback information is given and analyzed. There are two major contributions in this article. On one hand, based on the multi-leader-follower games, discrete time dynamic multi-leader-follower games are proposed. On the other hand, dynamic programming algorithms are presented to attack discrete time dynamic multi-leader-follower games with multi-players under feedback information structure for dependent followers.