Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On selfish routing in internet-like environments
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
On the interaction of multiple overlay routing
Performance Evaluation - Performance 2005
Drafting behind Akamai (travelocity-based detouring)
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Interaction of ISPs: Distributed Resource Allocation and Revenue Maximization
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
P4p: provider portal for applications
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Reinforcement learning: a survey
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Prices are right: managing resources and incentives in peer-assisted content distribution
IPTPS'08 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Peer-to-peer systems
Cooperative content distribution and traffic engineering in an ISP network
Proceedings of the eleventh international joint conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Traffic engineering, content distribution, and continuous potential games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
D-MORE: Dynamic mesh-based overlay peer-to-peer infrastructure
Computer Communications
Modelling the tradeoffs in Overlay-ISP cooperation
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
Internet-based Virtual Computing Environment: Beyond the data center as a computer
Future Generation Computer Systems
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Traditionally, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) make profit by providing Internet connectivity, while content providers (CPs) play the more lucrative role of delivering content to users. As network connectivity is increasingly a commodity, ISPs have a strong incentive to offer content to their subscribers by deploying their own content distribution infrastructure. Providing content services in a provider network presents new opportunities for coordination between server selection (to match servers with subscribers) and traffic engineering (to select efficient routes for the traffic). In this work, we utilize a mathematical framework to show that separating server selection and traffic engineering leads to a sub-optimal equilibrium, even when the CP is given accurate and timely information about network conditions. Leveraging ideas from cooperative game theory, we propose that the system implements a Nash bargaining solution that significantly improves the fairness and efficiency of the joint system. This study is another step toward a systematic understanding of the interactions between those who generate and distribute content and those who provide and operate networks.