Exploiting Omissive Faults in Synchronous Approximate Agreement
IEEE Transactions on Computers
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Sabotage-tolerance mechanisms for volunteer computing systems
Future Generation Computer Systems - Best papers from symp. on cluster computing and the grid (CCGRID 2001)
Dependability: Basic Concepts and Terminology
Dependability: Basic Concepts and Terminology
BMEI '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on BioMedical Engineering and Informatics - Volume 01
BMEI '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on BioMedical Engineering and Informatics - Volume 02
Spatial Distribution Patterns, Power Law, and the Agent-based Directed Diffusion Sensor Networks
PERCOM '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Sixth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Flexible Rollback Recovery in Dynamic Heterogeneous Grid Computing
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
EGC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 European conference on Advances in Grid Computing
A measurement-based design and evaluation methodology for embedded control systems
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
On the impact of jamming attacks on cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks
Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop
Hi-index | 0.00 |
When designing a system that has strong reliability, security, or survivability requirements one moves in a trade-off space with a delicate balance between causes and effects that have implications on various objective functions such as cost, performance, availability, analyzability, predictability, or feasibility. The key issues are: 1) given an existing system or application, what are the impacts of adjustments in the fault assumptions, 2) given an existing system or application, what are the impacts of adding or subtracting security features, and 3) given performance, availability, security, or survivability requirements, how can one determine feasibility based on the infrastructure- or application-induced limitations. This research promotes design for survivability and analyzability to allow for effective assessment of the trade-off space from the view of dynamically changing fault models and the analyzability of a system. It gives pointers to new research directions and presents solutions that aid in making operational decisions or assessing impacts of design decisions.