Efficient auction-based grid reservations using dynamic programming

Authors:
Andrew Mutz;Rich Wolski
Affiliations:
University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA;University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM/IEEE conference on Supercomputing
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Auction mechanisms have been proposed as a means to efficiently and fairly schedule jobs in high-performance computing environments. The Generalized Vickrey Auction has long been known to produce efficient allocations while exposing users to truth-revealing incentives, but the algorithms used to compute its payments can be computationally intractable. In this paper we present a novel implementation of the Generalized Vickrey Auction that uses dynamic programming to schedule jobs and compute payments in pseudo-polynomial time. Additionally, we have built a version of the PBS scheduler that uses this algorithm to schedule jobs, and in this paper we present the results of our tests using this scheduler.