Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
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TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
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We examine some old and new paradoxes of probability, give a rough account of probabilistic conditionals, and prove a new result about non-monotonicity in probabilistic conditionals. It is well known that such conditionals are not monotonic --- a conditional which is true can become false when additional hypotheses are added. We show that nonetheless, the conditionals are usuallymonotonic, or roughly speaking that we do not actually have to worry about non-monotonicity in practice.