Cryptanalysis of the TRMC-4 Public Key Cryptosystem

  • Authors:
  • Xuyun Nie;Lei Hu;Jintai Ding;Jianyu Li;John Wagner

  • Affiliations:
  • State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, 45220, USA and Fachbereich Informatik, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany;State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, 45220, USA

  • Venue:
  • ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In 2006, the inventors of TRMC public key cryptosystem proposed a new variant of TRMC, TRMC-4, which can resist the existing attack, in particular, the Joux et al attack. In this paper, we show that the new version is vulnerable to attack via the linearization equations (LE) method. For any given valid ciphertext and its corresponding TRMC-4 public key, we can derive the corresponding plaintext within 224$\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$-operations, after performing once for the public key a computation of complexity less than 234. Our results are confirmed by computer experiments.