Evaluating risk: flexibility and feasibility in multi-agent contracting
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
A decommitment strategy in a competitive multi-agent transportation setting
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Bridging the gap between planning and scheduling
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Improving Patient Activity Schedules by Multi-agent Pareto Appointment Exchanging
CEC-EEE '06 Proceedings of the The 8th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology and The 3rd IEEE International Conference on Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce, and E-Services
Auction algorithms for decentralized parallel machine scheduling
Parallel Computing - Optimization on grids - Optimization for grids
Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
Theoretical Computer Science
Distributed patient scheduling in hospitals
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
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In real-life multi-agent planning problems, long-term plans will often be invalidated by changes in the environment during or after the planning process. When this happens, short-term operational planning and scheduling methods have to be applied in order to deal with these changed situations. In addition to the dynamic environment, in such planning systems we also have to be aware of sometimes conflicting interests of different parties, which render a centralized approach undesirable. In this paper we investigate two agent-based scheduling architectures where stakeholders are modelled as autonomous agents. We discuss this approach in the context of an interesting airport planning problem: the planning and scheduling of deicing and anti-icing activities. To coordinate the competition between agents over scarce resources, we have developed two mechanisms: one mechanism based on decommitment penalties, and one based on a more traditional (Vickrey) auction. Experiments show that the auction-based mechanism best respects the preferences of the individual agents, whereas the decommitment mechanism ensures a fairer distribution of delay over the agents.