Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Fulfilling or Violating Obligations in Normative Multiagent Systems
IAT '04 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Introduction to normative multiagent systems
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
Normative multiagent systems and trust dynamics
Trusting Agents for Trusting Electronic Societies
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In this paper we introduce a formal attacker model for normative multi-agent systems. In this context, an attacker is an agent trying to profit from norm violation, for example because the violation is not detected, it is not being sanctioned, or the sanction is less than the profit of violation. To deliberate about norm violations, an attacker has a self model and a model of the normative multi-agent system, which in our case have the same structure. Moreover, we assume that an attacker violates a norm only when it profits from it, and the attacker therefore plays a violation game with the system. On a variety of examples, we show also how our model of violation games based also on agent abilities or power extends our earlier model based on motivations only.