Large primes in stream cipher cryptography
AUSCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the international conference on cryptology on Advances in cryptology
An Efficient Stream Cipher Alpha1 for Mobile and Wireless Devices
Proceedings of the 8th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Algebraic attacks on stream ciphers with linear feedback
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Algebraic attacks on clock-controlled cascade ciphers
INDOCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptology in India
Using wiedemann's algorithm to compute the immunity against algebraic and fast algebraic attacks
INDOCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptology in India
Two algebraic attacks against the F-FCSRs using the IV mode
INDOCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Cryptology in India
INDOCRYPT'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in India
Efficient computation of algebraic immunity for algebraic and fast algebraic attacks
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Algebraic attacks on clock-controlled stream ciphers
ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
On algebraic immunity and annihilators
ICISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Algebraic attacks have been applied to several types of clock-controlled stream ciphers. However, to date there are no such attacks in the literature on mutually clock-controlled ciphers. In this paper, we present a preliminary step in this direction by giving the first algebraic analysis of mutually clock-controlled feedback shift register stream ciphers: the bilateral stop-and-go generator, A5/1, Alpha 1 and the MICKEY cipher. We show that, if there are no regularly clocked shift registers included in the system, mutually clock-controlled feedback shift register ciphers appear to be highly resistant to algebraic attacks. As a demonstration of the weakness inherent in the presence of a regularly clocked shift register, we present a simple algebraic attack on Alpha 1 based on only 29 keystream bits.