Cryptanalytic Flaws in Oh et al.'s ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Authors:
Meng-Hui Lim;Sanggon Lee;Hoonjae Lee
Affiliations:
Department of Ubiquitous IT, Graduate School of Design & IT, Dongseo University, Busan, Korea 617-716;Department of Information and Communication, Dongseo University, Busan, Korea 617-716;Department of Information and Communication, Dongseo University, Busan, Korea 617-716
Venue:
ICCSA '08 Proceedings of the international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications, Part II
Year:
2008

Citing 7
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Abstract

A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which is used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. In 2007, Oh et al. proposed an efficient ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol on elliptic curve pairings, which is believed to be able to generate two session keys securely after a protocol execution. However, we discover that their protocol is in fact susceptible to the basic impersonation attack as well as the key compromise impersonation attack. In this paper, we present the imperfections of Oh et al.'s scheme and subsequently we suggest a slight modification to the scheme which would resolve the problems.